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Economic enterprises face two, related, managerial problems: effective management of the
enterprise’s activities, and communicating to outsiders that the enterprise is in fact well-run.  These
problems were especially difficult in the credit cooperative movement that grew up in Germany in the
second half of the nineteenth century.  These successful cooperatives thrived because they could harness
the information and ties among local people to obviate many of the problems that faced other lenders.
Doing so required managers who were themselves local people.  Yet few if any locals had any banking
experience, and most were not even familiar with basic accounting methods.  These local managers created
internal management problems and enhanced outside suspicion of the cooperatives as banking enterprises.
The methods developed to overcome these problems relied on a combination of local initiative and regional
assistance that was typical of the movement as a whole.  The movement’s ability to train its own talent
suggests a broader impact not captured by statistics on membership or financial assets.
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The credit cooperatives introduced in Germany during the 1850s were individually small and had
as their members poor people with similar economic fortunes. Most rural cooperatives were managed by
volunteers who had little banking or business experience. Yet by World War I there were about 19,000
such cooperatives and together they had issued some 8 percent of all German banking liabilities. Their
success in the face of obvious obstacles seems puzzling. One key to their success was an ability to
capitalize on cheap information and low-cost sanctions to provide effective, low-cost credit to people in
rural areas. The ability to use social ties as the basis for lending came at a steep cost, however. Their
very logic required that the cooperatives be confined to a specific area and that, in rural areas especially,
they be very small. One consequence of this design was that nearly all cooperatives were managed by
local volunteers with no banking experience and little formal bookkeeping background. Their basic design
created two problems that affect virtually any economic enterprise: the cooperatives had to find some
way to ensure that local institutions were well-run, and they had to find some way to communicate their
condition to outsiders such as potential members and depositors.
One way to view the concerns raised in this paper is to consider them in the light of current
research on information problems and financial intermediaries. The model of a financial intermediary
current today is based on Diamond (1984). In this delegated monitor model, the intermediary exists
because it is more efficient for depositors to lend their money to an intermediary who can invest it and
monitor its use on their behalf.  The Diamond model implies that there are two information and incentive
problems. The first problem is the reason for the monitor’s existence, as noted. The second problem is
that the bank’s managers have more information on the investment projects than do their depositors, and
can use that superior information opportunistically. The second issue has led to a distinct literature asking
why bank managers are trusted not to behave this way. One approach follows Calomiris and Kahn2
(1991). They argue that the sequential-service rule for deposits, which seems irrational because it helps to
promote banking panics, is a mechanism that allows bank managers to commit to refraining from
opportunistic behavior. Others note that the second information problem helps to explain the roles of kin
and other closed groups in early financial intermediaries (Lamoreaux 1991, 1994).
The German credit cooperatives faced both of the problems at the heart of the Diamond model
and a more general problem that has in some ways disappeared from the literature. Diamond’s manager
knows what he is doing. Much of the problem facing the cooperatives was that their managers made
mistakes in a way that does not happen in Diamond’s model. One can also view the Diamond model as
implying a problem of confidence (as a depositor, how do I know the manager will not abuse my
interests?). For the cooperatives the confidence issue was as much about thinking the managers knew
what they were doing as an issue of trusting them not to misbehave deliberately.
This paper is part of a larger project that uses economic theory and a broader perspective on the
German financial system in this period to ask why the cooperatives prospered. Elsewhere I have argued
that central to their success was an ability to harness ties among members to overcome, at low cost, the
information and enforcement problems that make it difficult and expensive for conventional banking
institutions to lend to poor people. Although Germany had both an urban and a rural credit cooperative
group, throughout I emphasize the rural institutions because their organization and methods made them
most distinctive. Guinnane (2001) lays out and tests the argument using manuscript business records from
several rural cooperatives. Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999)
analyze the economics of this type of lending institution. Guinnane (1997) provides additional detail on the
regional organizations discussed below, especially the Central cooperative banks which are only
mentioned in the present paper. That paper also provides more detail on the internecine conflict that1 Wygodzinski (1917, p.478), from the yearbooks of the several associations. A fourth group of urban cooperatives
outside the Schulze-Delitzsch association (Hauptverband deutscher gewerblicher Genossenschaften) had 440 cooperatives with
120 thousand members in 1914.
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created additional problems of confidence within the cooperative movement. Guinnane (1994) and
Guinnane and Henriksen (1998) offer a comparative perspective.
Our discussion here falls naturally into three stages. After some additional background, we first 
describe the basic structure of the local cooperatives. Next we consider the more relevant issue, which is
how the local managers performed and what problems they faced. We then turn to the regional auditing
associations that were erected to help ensure good management and to help the cooperatives instill
confidence in their operations.
The cooperative movement and its regional institutions
By the 1880s there were three dominant groups of credit cooperatives in Germany, reflecting the
activities of the three men most responsible for this movement. Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch (1808-1883)
founded several cooperative associations during the 1840s and 1850s. By 1861 there were 364 Schulze-
Delitzsch credit cooperatives with nearly 49,000 members (Herrick and Ingalls (1915, p.267)). Friedrich
Raiffeisen (1818-1888) was at first an imitator of Schulze-Delitzsch. Raiffeisen’s first credit cooperative
was founded in Neuwied (Prussian Rheinland) in 1864. The number of Raiffeisen cooperatives at first
grew rapidly, but was later eclipsed by cooperatives affiliated with a group formed by Wilhelm Haas in
the 1870s. At the outbreak of World War I the Schulze-Delitzsch credit cooperatives numbered some 945
credit cooperatives with 620 thousand members, the Raiffeisen, 4400 cooperatives with 485 thousand
members, and those affiliated with the Haas group, 11,165 cooperatives with over one million members.1
Ordinarily only one person per household could join a credit cooperative, so these membership figures
imply that millions of Germans were part of the movement.2 This “Preussenkasse,” founded in 1895, was controversial and not all rural Centrals dealt with it.
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The differences between Schulze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen can be summarized briefly. Schulze-
Delitzsch thought credit cooperatives should be primarily urban, discourage the very poor as members,
and have some paid, full-time management. When it became legal in 1889 (after his death), his followers
advocated that credit cooperatives convert to a limited-liability basis. Raiffeisen, on the other hand,
worked primarily in rural areas, wanted cooperatives to be open to everyone in their community, and
thought that only a part-time treasurer be paid. His group insisted on unlimited liability for credit
cooperatives even after 1889. Haas and other cooperative leaders took a less doctrinaire approach (for
example, Haas’s group advocated limited liability in areas with very unequal wealth distributions), but
most credit cooperatives outside Schulze-Delitzsch’s group were rural and resembled, in most respects,
Raiffeisen’s. Haas’s group was less centralized than Raiffeisen’s and tolerated greater diversity among
its members.
Most cooperative groups developed two regional associations to help manage the problems their
local cooperatives faced. A type of regional cooperative bank (called, confusingly, a “Central” bank)
emerged to take deposits from and make loans to member cooperatives. The Haas group had dozens of
regional centrals, while the Raiffeisen group had a single institution with several branches. The Schulze-
Delitzsch group did not develop Centrals in the same way and relied on commercial banks for liquidity
services. The other regional organizations were the auditing associations detailed below. At the national
level there was a single cooperative bank founded by the Prussian government that acted as a sort of
Central’s central.2 The auditing associations had no national counterpart. Each of the main cooperative
groups had a national federation that brought together all their constituent institutions, including
cooperatives engaged in activities other than credit.3 The Aufsichtsrat was also a feature of some forms of large-scale corporations in Germany. There is some debate, in
that context, over what it was supposed to do and what is actually did. In the context of the cooperatives its intended role is
clear.
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The sources for this project allow a close look at both individual cooperatives and the regional
associations that worked with them. I have manuscript business records for several credit cooperatives
for the period prior to 1914. Throughout this paper these are called “study” cooperatives and are referred
to by the name of the village in which they were located. Guinnane (1997, In Press) provides more detail
on these institutions. I also draw on the annual reports of auditing associations and on a lively cooperative
and academic press. All of these sources must be treated with some care. The reports of the auditing
associations especially contain an element of self-justification, as we will see.
1. The local cooperatives
Credit cooperatives shared internal organizational features regardless of their type, in part
because of legal requirements. The management committee (Vorstand) represented the cooperative
legally and made most important decisions: accepting new members, granting loans, etc. The supervision
committee (Aufsichtsrat) met less frequently to oversee the management committee. The supervisory
committee's primary role was to review and approve the management committee's decisions and to act as
a sort of internal auditor.3 In some matters (such as for very large loans, or a loan to a member of the
management committee) the supervisory committee had first say. Members of these two committees
served terms of fixed length and no single person could be on both committees at once. The cooperative’s
membership as a whole (Generalversammlung) met annually to elect the members to the management
and supervision committees and to make decisions on basic policies such as interest rates. Membership in
the cooperative was not automatic, but once accepted into the cooperative all members could participate4 The appendix to Cahill (1913) includes an English translation of the cooperatives law as amended by later acts.
5 For example, the Maulburg cooperative started paying the members of the management and supervision committees 1
Mark for every meeting they attended (Protokollbuch für den Vorstand, Maulburg, 28.7.1902). In 1914 the Eifa (Hatzfeld)
cooperative paid the head of the management committee 45 Marks and the head of the supervision committee 25. The treasurer’s
income is discussed below.
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on an equal basis in elections for management positions and on the important policy issues put to a general
vote.4
The cooperative’s day-to-day business activities, as well as its bookkeeping, were undertaken by
a treasurer who was in some cooperatives a designated member of the management committee, and in
others, a cooperative member selected by the management committee. Schulze-Delitzsch advocated that
all cooperative managers be paid and eventually many urban cooperatives had at least one full-time,
professional employee.  In the Raiffeisen group and in most Haas cooperatives the only paid employee
was the treasurer. Some other rural cooperatives paid their managers a small fee for attending meetings,
but how common this practice was I cannot say.5
The division of labor between the supervision and management committees was laid down in the
cooperative’s statutes, but only in general terms, and in different cooperatives these committees had
different degrees of discretion. In some the management committee controlled all dealings with the
treasurer, while in others the supervision committee retained the right to set the treasurer’s pay. In some
the management committee could approve virtually any loan up to the maximum per-member credit laid
down in the statutes, while in others the supervision committee had to approve any loan larger than some
smaller limit. To take another example, in some cooperatives the management committee managed cash
as it saw fit, instructing the treasurer when to send funds to the Central, while in others these activities
required the active agreement of the supervision committee.7
The problems
We focus on the period from the 1870s through the outbreak of World War I. In this period the
credit cooperatives were very simple banking operations. Most of their assets were loans. Rural
cooperatives were highly leveraged, with 90 percent or more of their liabilities being deposits, while urban
credit cooperatives typically had lower leverage because of their larger member shares. Most
transactions involved cash. (Some established checking and other payment services in the early twentieth
century, but this practice remained rare prior to World War I.) Cash came in as deposits and was
disbursed as loans, and when the cooperative had excess or insufficient cash, its deposits at or drawings
from its Central cooperative bank took the form of cash. Managing this institution entailed three problems:
Fraud: There was ample opportunity for a manager to steal from the cooperative by taking cash
or falsifying records. Embezzlement by treasurers was rare but a constant concern. Closely
related to fraud are decisions that reflect a private interest, such as extending credit to someone
who is not really credit-worthy but who has some connection to a manager. 
Record-keeping: The mechanics of keeping records that accounted for all inflows and outflows
of funds was an enormous undertaking in a day prior to automatic information systems. In
addition to this simple level of record-keeping, the cooperative had to ensure that all legal
documents recording outstanding loans were in order. The cooperative also had to maintain
minutes of meetings, lists of members, and other internal information required under the
cooperative law. 8
Mistakes: A final and important class of problems arose out of honest mistakes. Admittedly a
residual category, these problems arise from decisions that are not attempts to take advantage of
the cooperative, and are not simply failure to keep adequate records. They are best thought of as
reflecting the managers’ imperfect grasp of the problems their institution can and might face. One
good example is a failure to monitor the cooperatives’ liquidity; most loans were for terms of five
years or more, and a failure to maintain adequate reserves could be disastrous. Similar problems
arose when a cooperative made a single very large loan.
One way to put these problems in perspective is to compare them to the principal-agent framework
implicit in Diamond’s model. All three of these problems can be cast in a moral-hazard framework; with
the proper incentives the cooperative could invest in ways to avoid fraud, book-keeping problems, and
honest mistakes. But the canonical examples used in economics usually assume that agents are competent
(as opposed to fully-informed) and the problem is motivating them to direct that competence as the
principal would wish. That is not the only problem here. 
2. The managers
The management committee membership was the cooperative’s hands-on manager, approving
loans, controlling accounts with the Central, and in general looking after the details of the institution’s
operations. The committee usually met every month. The supervision committee met on a quarterly basis
and its minutes are perfunctory. This division of labor is reflected in many cooperatives in the identity of
the individuals on two committees. The management committee tended to have the local business and
farming leaders, while the supervision committee was the place for a sympathetic local noble or
clergyman. Some accounts suggest a deliberate strategy of recruiting prominent, trustworthy people9
specifically for the supervision committee, where they would not have to do much work but would build
public confidence nonetheless.
Most members of the two committees were, upon election, for the first time taking on a position
that involved formal record-keeping and reporting. How were they recruited, and how long did they have
to learn the job? Most cooperative Festschriften give a list of all members of the management
committees and the dates of their service, permitting us to construct measures of turnover for those two
bodies. Nine cooperative Festschriften have complete information on the management terms in the period
before their formation and 1914. These histories suggest that the members of both the management
committee and the supervision committee served for very long times. In four of nine cooperatives 100
percent of all terms on the management committee were for at least five years. In all nine cases there
was no turnover at all on the Management committee in 80 percent of the years between the
cooperative’s founding and 1914 (the youngest cooperative in this group was formed in 1899, but most
date to the 1880s and earlier). One of the few individuals who left the Leer management committee died
in office and was replaced by his son. Experience on the supervision committee was more varied, and
terms tended to be shorter. But once again, the median term for a committee member in these
cooperatives was about 15 years. Given that the duties for the management committee were much more
time-consuming than those for the other committee it seems unlikely that the little turnover we observe
was due to the burdens of office.
There are several possible interpretations of this lack of turnover. The first and most likely
interpretation is simply that the managers worked out well and the cooperative saw no reason to replace
people when elections were held. A second interpretation is that there were so few people in a given
village willing and able to serve in such a position that turnover was, in fact, impossible. The references to
elections contained in the minutes of the Generalversammlung meetings do not support this view.  Some6 Direct election of the treasurer by the members was not common practice in the cooperatives studied. Protokollbuch
für die Generalversammlung, Huttersdorf, 28.7.1912.
7 Protokollbuch für den Vorstand, Aussen, 29.7.1906. 
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elections for the management committee and supervision committee were contested. Even people who
were elected by significant majorities faced real opposition. To take one fairly typical example, in 1912, in
the Huttersdorf (Schmelz) cooperative, Peter Gross was elected treasurer with 158  out of 271 votes. But
he had four opponents, one of whom garnered 64 votes.6 There were other people in the cooperative who
at least thought they were qualified to serve.
 A third interpretation of these low turnover rates would be that the people running the
cooperative were a small group using it for their own ends. This view, which is a theme in some
contemporary criticisms of the cooperative movement,  is hard to reconcile with contested elections, and
hard to reconcile with a lack of any overt evidence of managerial abuse. I know of no instances where
managers used their positions to secure the nineteenth-century equivalent of a nice office. In some
instances cooperatives paid for their managers to travel to a cooperative training session in a city, but the
amounts reimbursed hardly suggest a wild holiday. For example, the management committee of the
Aussen (Schmelz) cooperative was voted 3 Marks each to cover travel costs associated with attending a
cooperative school.7 These costs seem more in the nature of a prudent investment in managerial
education. There is also little evidence of managers receiving a disproportionate share of loanable funds.
Loans to management committee members required the approval of the supervision committee. Of all the
study cooperatives, only the Leer cooperative’s management committee received many loans, and in that
cooperative a large share of deposits were forwarded to the Central as a matter of course. Loans to the
managers were not depriving anyone in the cooperative.8 In some cases the auditor would call attention to low attendance. For example, the 1914 meeting of the Geschwend
(Maulburg) cooperative was attended by  69 members. The auditor wrote “of 121" next to the figure “69" in the report. 
Protokollbuch für die Generalversammlung, Geschwend (Maulburg) 8.6.1914; Protokollbuch für die Generalversammlung,
Aussen  (Limbach) 26.8.1906.
9 Protokollbuch für die Generalversammlung, Gersbach, 16.11.1880. 
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The membership in credit cooperatives was remarkably stable. A few members were ejected for
failure to repay a loan or for some other reason, but this event was extremely rare. Most members who
left a cooperative did so because of death, and a handful resigned when they left the area in which the
cooperative operated. Thus the annual meeting consisted of individuals with ever-growing experience in
how the institution worked. On the other hand, the minutes of the annual meetings show that attendance
at these meetings could be poor, as little as one-half the current membership. The Aussen (Limbach)
cooperative tried several times to change its statutes but could not because it could not get the required
quorum to attend the annual meeting. In one year only 44 of 111 members showed up. 8 Cooperatives
took several approaches to the problem. One was exhortation; articles in the cooperative press on the
importance of the general meeting were quite common. Another was to provide financial incentives.
Some cooperatives paid members to attend the annual meeting or fined members who did not attend. The
Gersbach (Maulburg) cooperative fined members 40 Pfennig for not attending the annual meeting.9 
The treasurer’s job
Nearly all accounts, both critical and supportive of the cooperative movement, agree that the
treasurer was the most important manager and that most problems in individual cooperatives reflect this
person’s failings. The range of responsibilities for a treasurer was considerable. He had to keep track of
all deposits and loans, manage the cooperative’s accounts at the regional Central, prepare promissory
notes (and mortgages if the cooperative was making mortgage loans), and compile monthly and annual10 Protokollbuch für die Generalversammlung, Adelhausen, 11.4.1905.
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reports for the internal managers and the auditing association. All of this was done without the assistance
of any mechanical calculation devices, although the printed forms and loan tables discussed below
provided some assistance. Treasurers tended to have “office hours,” regular times (such as after church
on Sundays) when they were available to accept deposits and do other business. In the Maulburg
cooperative, for example, these hours were set as 12-1 on Sundays and Wednesdays 6-7 in the winter and
7-8 in the summer. They were also expected to be available at other times, for example to assist a
member who lived outside the village but was in town on other business. Treasurers used their homes as
their “office,” meeting cooperative members there and keeping both the cooperative safe and all record-
books there. Most cooperatives required their treasurer to post some kind of bond or other security
commitment against fraud or embezzlement. For treasurers with assets, such as a farm, this was not a
serious problem. But for the many who were teachers this was a serious issue. The most common
solution in the study cooperatives was for someone else to sign a note, the same kind of commitment a co-
signer would make. In the Adelhausen (Maulburg) cooperative, for example, the treasurer’s honesty was
guaranteed by a 1000 Mark note of this sort.10
Given this person’s role, cooperatives recognized the importance of paying a salary high enough
to attract and retain a treasurer with the right qualities. Just how much to pay was a topic of lively
discussion. Higher pay meant, implicitly, reduced reserves for the cooperative, higher interest charges for
borrowers, and lower interest payments to depositors. The pay was set annually by the cooperative’s
management committee. In 1914 the Diestedde cooperative paid its treasurer 1200 Marks, and in 1913 the
smaller Leer cooperative paid its treasurer 800 Marks. This was a significant sum for the cooperative,
which often devoted half or more of its net interest income to this purpose. Many treasurers were
schoolteachers, and by comparing the cooperative’s payments to the official schoolteacher salaries we11 The details underlying this calculation can be found in Guinnane (2001, pp. XX).
12 Protokollbuch für den Vorstand, Maulburg, 12.6.1882
13 More amusingly, in 1904 the Landwirtschaftliches Genossenschaftsblatt pleaded with its officials to use German
words rather than their French equivalents. This was not nationalism. French substitutions were typical of pedants of the day,
and according to the request made publications difficult to understand for the "simple people" who ran the cooperatives.
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can get a sense of how much the cooperative’s treasurer salaries approximated the cost of the recipient’s
time. Elsewhere I have used detailed information from the business records of the Leer cooperative to get
some sense of how the treasurer was paid, how  that compares to his regular job, and how much time he
devoted to the cooperative. A schoolteacher in that region in 1905 earned about 1750 Marks per year
from his regular job. The cooperative paid him 400 Marks for his efforts that year, or about 23 percent of
the income from his main job.11
Cooperative manuals advised against paying the treasurer according to a formula that gave him
an incentive to increase the number of transactions, loans, etc.  Anton Quabeck, an influential leader in
the Westfalian cooperative association, wrote in his cooperative handbook that if the treasurer’s pay was
a fixed percentage of the cooperatives’ income then “he would have an interest in the cooperative earning
as much as possible, and could pressure the management committee to this end” (Quabeck 1913, p.128).
Whatever the advice, there are examples of explicit formulas of the sort Quabeck feared. The Gersbach
(Maulburg) cooperative paid its treasurer 40 Pfennigs for every Mark of cooperative income, and the
Maulburg cooperative paid its treasurer 30 Pfennigs for every Mark of turnover.12 
Embezzlement
Treasurers lie at the heart of most cooperative horror stories. Few rural treasurers had any
business experience at all. Cooperative manuals introduce double-entry book-keeping as if it is an
unknown concept (and why should it be familiar to a schoolteacher?).13 One of the auditor's first tasks in14 Estimates below suggest that embezzlements took place in less than one cooperative per thousand per year. The
available information on these incidents is not sufficient to test econometrically, for example, whether publicity over an 
embezzlement in a cooperative harmed other cooperatives in a region.
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examining cooperative records was to verify the arithmetic. More than a few record-books are filled with
the red corrections of an auditor. There were also cases of extreme laxness. Sometimes an auditor would
find that a treasurer had not been keeping an entire set of required books, or had failed to provide the right
report at the specified time. But the real fear was embezzlement. The cooperatives operated primarily on
cash. Only in the early twentieth century did they begin to use checks and other payment means, so a
clever treasurer could steal, under the right conditions, thousands of Marks.
Embezzlement by cooperative treasurers was extremely rare, although it did not have to be
common to pose a threat to the movement overall.14 A problem we encounter in studying embezzlement is
its role in the rhetoric of internecine conflict. The Schulze-Delitzsch group often pointed to the
combination of unpaid managers and part-time treasurers in rural credit cooperatives as an invitation to
trouble. Thus the rural credit cooperatives were very sensitive on the issue. For their part, the rural
auditing associations stressed the value of their services by discussing cases where they detected an
embezzlement before serious harm was done. Whatever their rhetorical import, embezzlements were real. 
One took place in the Maulburg study cooperative. At a joint meeting of the management and supervision
committees in 1899, the auditor Bern reported that the late treasurer had helped himself to about 1275
Marks of the cooperative's money. The auditor recommended several steps to help cover the loss. At a
general meeting the same day, the auditor reminded the membership that the management committees
and current treasurer should not be held accountable. Since no member had objected to the (fraudulent)
presentation of the previous year's report, they were equally responsible for the shortfall. Several days
later the widow and children of the deceased treasurer signed an agreement to repay the embezzled15 Protokollbuch für den Vorstand, Maulburg, May 1899.
16 Blätter für Genossenschaftswesen 1901(40) p.506 and 1902 (49) pp.389, 423. 
17 Volume 36, 1909, pp.483-487.
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funds.15 This is a simple tale with a happy ending.  More lurid accounts in the cooperative press suggest
that treasurers in larger cooperatives could get away with a lot more. The Schulze-Delitzsch organ
reported one case of a 7500 Mark embezzlement in a rural cooperative in 1901, and suggested that the
failure of another, with losses of nearly 100,000 Marks, reflected the relatively great power of treasurers
in cooperatives where other managers were not paid.16
An article published in 1909 by Anton Quabeck in the Haas group’s organ
Genossenschaftspresse gives a generous and revealing picture of how embezzlements affected the
cooperative movement. He notes that cooperatives from every group face this problem, and that the
damage to an affected institution goes far beyond financial matters. Embezzlements contribute to mistrust
of cooperatives by outsiders and destroy trust within the affected institution. In a common complaint he
notes that other banking institutions (he names savings banks in particular) suffer the same problem but
for some reason embezzlements elsewhere do not receive as much attention and are not used to call an
entire institutional form into question. He concludes with a routine call for great vigilance, but refrains
(unlike many others) from claiming that cooperatives of any one type are more or less prone to
embezzlement.17
Embezzlements were the most dramatic and well-publicized management problem in credit
cooperatives. But we should keep them in perspective. They were rare, and few cooperatives closed as a
result. Most of the amounts stolen seem to have been recovered or were so small that the cooperative
was able to make good the amount through retaining earnings. This ability to contain embezzlements no
doubt reflects the same kind of information that enabled the cooperatives to lend on good terms.16
Treasurers lived in a small community and it would be hard to conceal the fruits of embezzlements.  The
cooperatives also had the benefit of outside assistance, which we consider next.
3. Help from the regional level
The local cooperative’s managers needed four forms of assistance. They needed someone to
correct errors they made. The needed education in both business record-keeping and the specifics of
cooperative practice. The structure of the local cooperative apparently could not provide the right
incentives for the managers to do their jobs properly all the time, and mechanisms that improved those
incentives were important to furthering the cooperatives’ growth and development. Finally, the
cooperatives needed some way to signal to others, including potential members and depositors, that they
were safe and well-run. The auditing associations the cooperative groups erected can be seen as an
attempt to meet all four of these needs.
Regular auditing was an outgrowth of the way the cooperative movement was first formed and
developed. From their earliest days the leaders of the cooperative movement promoted regional
associations of cooperatives to share information, lobby governments for legal changes to make it easier
to form and run cooperatives, and to promote new cooperatives. In both the Schulze-Delitzsch and
Raiffeisen groups these regional associations encouraged a sort of informal audit of member
cooperatives. As the movement grew and public awareness of criticisms leveled against cooperatives
became a more serious concern, some cooperative associations made periodic audits a condition for
membership. Schulze-Delitzsch, for example, recommended that the regional organizations in his group
conduct audits (Parisius and Crüger 1890, p. LVII; Parisius 1895, p.12). Most of the regional associations
in the Schulze-Delitzsch group made regular audits a condition of membership in the 1870s (Parisius and17
Crüger 1890, p. LVIII). Some rural associations had followed suit by the early 1880s (Beham 1940, p.18).
But these audits had no legal status before 1889. 
During his lifetime Schulze-Delitzsch successfully resisted compulsory audits for cooperatives.
Calls for compulsory auditing typically came from the cooperative movement’s enemies, and took the
form of demanding examination by state officials. Several bills to this effect had been introduced in the
Reichstag in the early 1880s (Wirsching 1969, pp.18-19). External auditing went hand-in-hand with
nineteenth-century developments in corporate forms that separated ownership from the control of an
enterprise; the auditor’s role was to guarantee to stockholders and others that the managers were
reporting the firm’s true condition. The English Joint Stock Company Act of 1844 required external
auditors, although it was not until much later that the details of such provisions made the external audits
satisfactory (Edey and Panitpakdi, 1956).  Schulze-Delitzsch (1909, pp.427-434) was aware of English
auditing practice and impressed by the auditing requirements of England’s friendly societies. Successive
German laws reflected English influence in extending compulsory external audits to an ever-wider class
of economic enterprises during the nineteenth century (Henning, 1990), and it was natural to fear that in
the case of cooperatives the external auditors would be state officials. Schulze-Delitzsch opposed state
audits for practical and political reasons. The practical objection was a concern about moral hazard; the
cooperative members and the supervision committee might see a compulsory audit as a substitute for their
own vigilance. On a political level he had a well-grounded suspicion of state involvement in credit
cooperatives and saw compulsory audits by state officials as the first step in making them de facto arms
of the government. 
The 1889 cooperatives law, which was the first such law that applied to the entire Reich, required
audits but should be seen as a victory for the cooperative movement. Article 51 of this act  required that
every cooperative be audited at least once every other year. Cooperatives could satisfy the requirement in18
one of two ways. They could ask the local court to appoint an auditor for that cycle only. Or they could
have the audit performed by someone who was an employee of the regional association, which by the
1889 law was transformed into a specialized auditing association. The 1889 law satisfied Schulze-
Delitzsch’s objections by placing the cooperative’s own associations in the role of primary auditors, thus
avoiding state control of the cooperative movement, but at the same time ensured external oversight of the
cooperatives. The cooperative group’s support for legal auditing also reflects the leadership’s judgement
that problems in individual cooperatives, even if rare, could do great damage to the movement as a whole.
Much of the concern stemmed from hostility among the various cooperative groups. The Schulze-
Delitzsch group, for example, thought that Raiffeisen cooperatives were flawed and that one way to
prevent them from doing damage to the entire movement was to force upon them a legal requirement for
regular audits.
Auditors and their associations
Each group had its own specific practices, but in every case auditing associations were either
restricted to a region or had “sub-associations” that were assigned to each region. In the rural cooperative
groups, auditing associations usually had a formal relationship with a Central cooperative bank, but the
two institutions were distinct and in theory a cooperative could belong to the auditing association without
any connection to the related Central. Member cooperatives paid a yearly fee plus a charge for each
audit. The auditing association also earned income from the sale of books, printed forms, etc. Most
auditing associations did not cover their full costs through these devices, and made up the deficit with gifts
from an associated Central and from modest grants from government agencies. These government grants
were the only direct State support for the cooperatives in our period, and were trivial in comparison to the
total costs of the cooperative movement as a whole. According to Busche (1963, p.108), many German18 Jahresbericht 1906 des Generalverbandes ländlicher Genossenschaften Raiffeisenscher Organisation für
Deutschland, p.9.
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governments would make one-time grants to various cooperative organs, but regular contributions went
almost exclusively to the auditing associations. The Saarland’s cooperative association is fairly typical in
this regard. In the period 1900-1908 it took in 65,935 Marks as direct charges for audits and another
95,465 Marks in membership fees. Only 11,400 Marks came from State sources. This left a deficit of
about 23,000 Marks, which was made up from profits generated by the Central cooperative bank (Faust
1909, p.99). For Prussia as a whole, total state grants to cooperatives for the period 1896/97 through 1903
amounted to some 36,400 Marks, or about 4500 Marks per year for all of Prussia (Busche 1963, p.108).
The auditors were at first individuals with experience in the cooperative movement. By the late
1890s the several cooperative groups were experimenting with more formal ways of training cooperative
auditors. The Haas group established its own school for cooperators in the early twentieth century. The
new school ran several different training programs, including courses designed for local managers and
treasurers. The Raiffeisen group at first took a different approach. It experimented with a formal
apprenticeship system, whereby prospective auditors were taken in hand by experienced auditors and
would participate in actual audits.18 But they gave up this tactic and in 1913 began a regular course for
new auditors. In that first year the course ran from October 2, 1913 through February 14, 1914, and
trained a total of 14 men. The youngest was 20 and the oldest 35, suggesting that these new auditors
planned a career in the movement. The breakdown of topics is revealing. The recruits had 516 hours of
instruction, which included the history and organization of the cooperative movement (60 hours),
cooperative law (96 hours), book-keeping (90 hours), general law (68 hours), and auditing (42 hours). The
other topics covered were also interesting; the new auditors had 53  hours of instruction on general19 Jahresbericht 1908 des Generalverbandes ländlicher Genossenschaften Raiffeisenscher Organisation für
Deutschland, pp13-14.
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banking matters, which suggests the movement’s interest in expanding cooperative services and their
members’ ties to the larger banking system.
Many cooperative leaders were concerned that the regional organizations (both Centrals and
auditing associations) not imply any liability across cooperatives. In the case of auditing associations, there
was no such liability, at least at first: even if an auditing association failed to detect problems that later led
to losses, the association bore no responsibility. The imperial court strengthened this principle with a ruling
in 1912 (Cahill 1913, p.277). Another fear was a specific form of moral hazard. Auditors thought that
some problems were beyond their detection, but well within the control of the supervision committee. The
Raiffeisen group’s report for 1908 makes this point with an account of an embezzlement in a cooperative
in the Berlin area. The treasurer had stolen money by withdrawing money from the Central on the
cooperative’s behalf, and then presenting false receipts to the management committee. The supervision
committee had discovered this problem, presumably because it was aware that the treasurer had been
asked to withdraw the money.  The conclusion drawn here is that the external auditor would have been
fooled as well.19
Audits
There were two basic kinds of audits. One took place via the mail; the treasurer sent all his
records to the auditing association, which checked them and sent them back. This method was cheaper
than a site-audit, but several observers note that lack of direct personal contact made this approach less
desirable than a personal visit. In the more common site audit the auditor came to the cooperative for one
or two days. He checked all the cooperative’s records, making sure that all arithmetic was correct, that all21
forms had been filled out correctly, and that legal documents (such as promissory notes) were in order.
Many cooperative records contain corrections made by the auditor. He ordinarily met with the treasurer
and the two committees to discuss his findings. Later he would send a formal report to the auditing
association, and the cooperative had to submit a response to his report.
The government and the auditing associations stressed that these audits were not to confine
themselves with checking sums or obvious accounting problems. Thus the audits were more
comprehensive than modern audits; they compare to a combination of an inspection by a public auditor
and a review by a management consultant. Over time the points of emphasis changed, but for most of the
period concerned here auditors were directed to ask hard questions about some basic management issues.
The supervision committee was always one concern. In 1897 the Prussian ministry for home affairs
circulated a directive concerning special points they wanted the auditors to cover. One was “Whether,
how often, and in what manner, the board of supervisors controls the committee of management in the
conduct of its business, and whether, how often, and in what manner and to what extent (internal) audits
were undertaken by the board of supervision (quoted in Cahill 1913, p.273).
Auditing associations stressed that these audits were rigorous and thorough, which of course is
what they had to say to justify the expense. The time put into each audit is enough to support the claim
that they were not pro-forma. Most auditing associations published summary tables that include the
average number of days spend at each cooperative audited that year. The Raiffeisen federation’s report
for 1906 is fairly typical. In that year the average audit took 3.7 days. But this figure conceals a great deal
of regional variation. The Nürnberg regional association spent an average of 1.7 days at each audit, while
in Strassburg the auditors took 5.4 days on average. As the report notes, there are several factors
underlying these differences. In some areas the auditors spent more time on travel to and from
cooperatives. Some regions were still building their movement, which implies that auditors spent more time20 Jahresbericht 1906 des Generalverbandes ländlicher Genossenschaften Raiffeisenscher Organisation für
Deutschland, pp.6-7.
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meeting with people interested in forming a cooperative. In some regions cooperatives were more
intensively involved in marketing and sales, which implied a more time-consuming audit. Most reports also
note that a cooperative that was audited every year was easier to audit each time.20
Only a few manuscript auditor’s reports survive, but these share common features that may have
been typical of others. Auditors often found simple arithmetic mistakes, and corrected them without
comment. They noted errors in record-keeping, such as the common problem of discrepancies between
the cooperative’s membership lists and the list filed with the court at which the cooperative was
registered. More serious problems were also common. Cooperatives sometimes violated their own rules
by, for example, granting an unusually large loan without the required agreement of the supervision
committee. Equally serious was failure to have the required meetings of the supervision committee, or a
failure to keep records of a required meeting. Even these more serious problems did not elicit much
comment from the auditor if dealt with promptly. 
The auditor’s report and the cooperative’s response could be testy. Formally the auditor was
someone hired by the cooperative to perform a legally-mandated audit. Informally he was sent by the
regional association to criticize, potentially, respected local people. We lack precise age distributions for
either managers or auditors, but in most cases the managers were considerably older than the auditors.
Sometimes the auditor reports contain comments that are strictly speaking none of the association’s
business, such as the claim that the treasurer should hold regular office hours. The auditing associations
and other cooperative leaders were sensitive to the fact that the external audits might be viewed as
implicit criticisms of managers. Thus the auditors were often portrayed as “advisors,” and the point of the
audit less a check than an opportunity for a professional with wide cooperative experience to discuss21See, for example,  Jahresbericht 1903 des Generalverbandes ländlicher Genossenschaften Raiffeisenscher
Organisation für Deutschland, p.4. 
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management problems. Quabeck’s introduction to the discussion of audits in his cooperatives manual is
typical of the turns of phrase used in these matters: 
If the management committee, supervision committee, and treasurer endeavor to the best of their
ability to deal conscientiously with every aspect of their responsibilities, they can only make minor
mistakes. But sometimes we have to take into account that the management committee,
supervision committee, and treasurer are not experts, that in some cases they do not have
business experience, and that in other cases this is only a part-time occupation. This is why many
have viewed it as desirable to have an expert, independent advisor stand at the cooperative’s side,
and at regular intervals conduct a thorough accounting and management audit (Quabeck 1913.
p.151)
 Quabeck (1913, p.152) refers to the auditor as a  “friend and advisor.” This phrase comes up repeatedly
in cooperative publications. The Raiffeisen federation refers to the auditor as “good advisor” who makes
the unpaid positions of the managers easier.21
When the auditor did not like what he found, the language could be direct, even harsh. Often an
auditor would note that a cooperative had taken no note of recommendations he made the previous year.
This is a common theme in the auditor’s reports for the Limbach (Schmelz) cooperative in the period
1901-1915. In an admittedly extreme case an auditor named Schwamborn addressed himself to severe
problems in a fairly new credit cooperative in Miel (now Rheinbach, Prussian Rheinland). In 1906 this
cooperative had only 24 members and had only one loan outstanding. In his report dated March 17, 1909,
Schwamborn noted that the management committee had met only once in 1908, and the general
membership not at all. Most deposits were in very large amounts (one for 30,000 Marks) and most of that22 The auditor’s reports and related material are held by the Rheinbach Raiffeisenbank. The Miel cooperative was
folded into the Rheinbach cooperative at a later date.
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was deposited at the Central cooperative bank. As the auditor put it, “the cooperative does not fulfill any
of its obligations.” A letter from the Cologne auditing association (dated 18 May 1909) gave the
cooperative four weeks to report back on how it will address these problems. The association noted that it
was “regrettable” that the cooperative’s managers were not doing the jobs they took on. In this case the
harsh language had the desired effect, because a second audit (15 June 1909) produced a satisfactory
result. Repeated audits of this sort were rare, but the Miel cooperative presented an especially dangerous
situation. A cooperative with lax management and a lot of money in deposits was an inviting target for
embezzlement.22
Several auditing associations published statistical summaries of results from their audits. These are
difficult to compare across societies or even years, because they rely on general categories like “good” or
“passable.” But most associations use consistent categories to rate the performance of various
management organs within a cooperative, and thus give a clear idea of what they thought were the weak
points in the institutions they audited.  In 1907 the Berlin auditing association of the Raiffeisen group
reported results as “very good,” “good,” “passable,” or “unsatisfactory.” Treasurers rated well, with 57
percent called good or very good. About 40 percent of management committees rated good or very good.
Only 35 percent of supervision  committees were evaluated this positively (quoted in Cahill 1913, p.275). 
Similar reports for other years and other areas tell a similar story. Treasurers were considered very strong
on average, while lax supervision committees were a constant source of worry. In some cases the only
effective internal supervision came from a single individual: “It is a matter of difficulty, as the reports of
many unions bear testimony, to secure in the local societies [cooperatives] the effective interest of the23 Jahresbericht 1906 des Generalverbandes ländlicher Genossenschaften Raiffeisenscher Organisation für
Deutschland, p.8.
24 Jahresbericht 1907 des Generalverbandes ländlicher Genossenschaften Raiffeisenscher Organisation für
Deutschland, p.13.
25
boards of supervision, and the committees are sometimes inclined to leave all matters to the decision of
their chairman” (Cahill 1913, p.276).
Some auditing associations took to publicizing their roles in detecting embezzlements, presumably
as a way of advocating the need for cooperative audits. Starting in the early twentieth century, Raiffeisen
annual reports include a description of the number and type of embezzlements their auditors detected. In
1906, for example, they found seven (out of 3301 cooperatives audited). The rhetoric here is important: by
admitting that 1.8 per thousand cooperatives suffered an embezzlement that year, they are reporting a
problem that is rare enough not to amount to an admission of their critics’ position, but common enough to
warrant the auditing fees. As they put it, “In seven cases the cooperative, because of the immediate action
of the auditing association, suffered no or only small losses. If the embezzlement had been discovered later
things might not have turned out so well.”23 In 1907 they only found four embezzlements in 3339
cooperatives audited, but the lesson is drawn more starkly: “If it were not for the auditing association, who
knows how serious the damage would have been for the cooperatives affected.”24 
The law did not require that cooperatives actually comply with recommendations made by their
auditor. Private auditors had no power to compel cooperatives to follow their recommendations at all.
Auditing associations could, and did, in drastic circumstances, resort to expelling member cooperatives
from their group. Auditing associations that were connected to a Central cooperative bank had a more
subtle tool at their disposal: the Central ordinarily asked auditors for a recommendation on loans to local
cooperatives, and here an auditing association could force a cooperative to bend to its wishes.25 Landwirtschaftliches Genossenschaftsblatt 1882(4), pp.77-78.
26 This is, it shows that X Marks at 2.25 percent implies an interest payment of X/160 Marks, etc.
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Other roles of the auditing association
The auditing associations offered another type of assistance in the form of monthly publications,
advice books, and printed forms. These aids are included in the archives of most of the study cooperatives,
and given that they were not free (they were, in fact, a source of income for the auditing associations) the
cooperatives must have found them of some use. The monthly magazines contained a variety of material,
much of which was little more than propaganda for cooperatives. But they also contained concrete advice
columns and frequent warnings about the dangers of lax management.  Occasional, detailed articles
suggest an effort to deal with related questions that arose in the course of audits. In 1882, for example, the
Raiffeisen organ ran a long article explaining promissory notes and the obligations of co-signers.25
These manuals were aimed at the cooperative leadership, and provided legal, accounting, and
managerial advice. In theory someone prepared to read the book through could establish and run a
cooperative in conformity with the law without any further outside advice. On specific legal issues, such as
how to write a promissory note, they were a cheap alternative to a lawyer. Some advice was practical and
reflected experience with other cooperatives. For example, some of these books caution against frequent
changes of interest rates, on the grounds that such changes create work for the treasurer.
Some aspects of these advice books speak to the kind of people the cooperatives could hire as
treasurer and the difficulty of accounting without calculation devices. Every advice book consulted has
detailed, step-by-step instructions on how to calculate interest payments. Part of these discussions are just
specific applications of the rules of arithmetic, but much of them are efforts to explain the mysteries of
percentages. Others contain tables that can shorten computations. Faust (1910, p.71), for example, has a
table that helps the treasurer convert payments at various interest rates to simple division.26 Another27
handbook contains more elaborate versions of the same shortcuts, along with detailed tables by capital size
and interest rate that obviate the need for any computation at all (Reichsverband der deutschen
landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaften 1904, pp.352-357).
The most useful printed help for the treasurer was probably the model record-books and forms
available from auditing associations. Some of these are little more than a standard ledger with a
cooperative logo on the cover. But others were created specifically to handle cooperative needs. A
cooperative could buy pre-printed promissory notes, forms for quarterly reports to the supervision
committee and annual reports to the auditor, and pre-printed constitutions (with blanks for local decisions
such as the length of committee terms). Reliance on these forms enforced some discipline, as the form told
the treasurer just what information was needed.
Auditing associations also ran courses to train the leaders of individual cooperatives. These
programs appear to be a late development; the first mention of them comes from the late 1890s. The
Raiffeisen federation claimed in 1914 that "next to auditing, the instruction of managers is the most
important task of the auditing association" (p.60). In promoting these courses the association noted that
most treasurers were either farmers or schoolteachers and so did not have much background in book-
keeping and related matters. The yearbook gave some details on courses offered in that year. The longest
was for treasurers, lasting 4-6 days and concentrating on book-keeping. One-day courses were also
offered for members of the management or supervision committee. In that year over 300 people had
attended the courses. The various regional organizations that made up the Haas group started them earlier.
At the 1902 annual meeting of this group, the desirability of these courses was hotly debated. Some
organizations took offense at the notion that their cooperatives were inferior because they did not attend 
such courses (Reichsverband 1902, pp.102-8).28
Why the auditing association?
The 1889 law did not require cooperatives to belong to an auditing association; they could instead
hire a private auditor. This raises an important issue about why cooperatives joined auditing associations.
We know from scattered complaints that auditing associations were usually more expensive (in part
because they were not content with the every-other-year audits required by law). We can also surmise,
both from scattered evidence and from a problem discussed below, that the auditing association took a
harder line than would most private auditors. Little is known about private auditors and how much they
charged. Kluge (1991, p.256) quotes one source as saying that most non-association auditors were clerks
of large banks, notaries, mayors, or managers. More generally, we have little information on the credit
cooperatives that were “wild,” that is, not a member of an auditing association. Most of the statistical
information on cooperatives in general was published by auditing associations, so by definition we know
less about the “wild” cooperatives than those that belonged to an association. Table 1 summarizes, for the
year 1914, the information that is available from official sources and thus accounts (in theory) for all
cooperatives. Even this information is not complete, as it was compiled by the Prussian statistical office,
and some of the smaller German states did not provide the information the Prussians required to compile
true all-German summaries. Nonetheless we can see some basic regularities in the table. The comparisons
are most interesting if we compare the Raiffeisen and Haas cooperatives (which are overwhelmingly
rural) to those that did not belong to an auditing association. The “wild” cooperatives are much larger than
their counterparts in the two rural federations, with nearly twice as many members per cooperative in the
unlimited liability group. The difference is even more pronounced in the limited-liability group, but that
comparison is of less interest because few limited-liability cooperatives belonged to either the Raiffeisen or27 Only 2 of some 4500 cooperatives in the Raiffeisen group and about 12 percent of the cooperatives in the Haas
associations had limited liability.
28 The figures for the Schulze-Delitzsch auditing  associations are 27 percent of cooperatives with 12 percent of
members. This comparison is misleading because the urban cooperative movement quickly achieved saturation, with relatively
few institutions formed after 1880, but the extant institutions grew rapidly in size. Source is Zeitschrift des Königlichen
Preussischen statistischen Bureaus. Mitteilungen zur deutschen Genossenschaftsstatistik, 1906. Extracted from pp.70-73*. 
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Haas auditing associations.27 We can also see that limited-liability cooperatives were more likely to
dispense with an association’s services; only 2 percent of unlimited-liability cooperatives were wild, but 13
percent of the limited-liability cooperatives fell into this category. An earlier version of the same report
allows us to calculate ages of the cooperatives within each auditing association as of 1906. The simplest
way to use this information is to consider the percentage of all member cooperatives that were formed
after 1890, the date at which auditing associations acquired their semi-official status. Of the wild
cooperatives, 77 percent of institutions accounting for 62 percent of their members had been formed aftere
1890. The corresponding figures for the Raiffeisen group are 89 percent of institutions and 82 percent of
members, and for the Haas group, 87 percent of institutions with 81 percent of members.28
This admittedly inadequate information and repeated comments in the cooperatives press supports
two generalizations. Most “wild” cooperatives were institutions that thought they did not need an auditing
association. They were larger and were more likely to have limited liability than those that belonged to an
auditing association. Older, more established cooperatives would have their own procedures in place and
would have their own reputations. They had less need of an auditing association to reassure a nervous
public. The liability differences are also instructive. In a limited-liability cooperative members were less
 concerned about external oversight because they had less at risk. A second type of wild cooperative is
one that had been ejected from an auditing association for refusing to live up to the association’s standards.29 Beham (1940, pp.19-20) claims that wild cooperatives had much higher bankruptcy rates than others. I do not know
the empirical basis for his assertion. He suggests that part of this higher bankruptcy rate could be a low quality of non-
cooperative auditors, but that the difference could reflect in part the character of cooperatives that had left an auditing
association.
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The two groups might not be mutually exclusive; a cooperative might decide to defy its auditing association
in part because it judged itself able to go it alone.29
The auditing associations and other cooperative groups stressed several advantages of their
auditors over the private auditors. Auditors hired by auditing associations dealt with nothing but
cooperatives. They were experts in a way a notary might not be. This is an important point. However
simple the credit cooperatives were, it is unlikely that most auditors with another background would in their
other line of work see the full range of issues that confronted these tiny banks. The association’s auditors
also had a stake in the future of the cooperative movement. Quabeck (1913, p.152) contrasts the auditing
association to another auditor who might treat the affair as a bureaucratic necessity. The implicit point here
is that private auditors had less to lose if the institutions they audited did poorly. The failure of a credit
cooperative, on the other hand, could damage the group and limit the advancement opportunities for an
auditor employed by that group.
The auditing associations were also aware that policemen themselves require policemen. In the
period prior to World War I all of the cooperative groups were experimenting with mechanisms to provide
oversight for their own auditors, including re-audits and “super-auditors” responsible to checking the work
of a group of primary auditors. The association publications do not say what kind of problems they
encountered, but one can imagine an auditor conspiring with a treasurer to conceal an embezzlement. No
such incident appears in any material I have seen. A more likely problem would probably have been an
inattentive auditor.31
To fully appreciate the potential advantages of the association auditor we need to step back and
consider the larger problem facing credit cooperatives. They were the subject of considerable criticism.
Leaders of other banking institutions resented them and thought their entire operations unsound. The public
(that is, potential members and depositors) were aware of this criticism. Perhaps more important, the
quarrels within the movement created at least in some quarters a strong sense that all cooperatives of a
given type (Raiffeisen, Haas, etc.) shared characteristics in common, whether strengths or weaknesses.
These shared perceptions imply a reputational externality within the cooperative movement. When
cooperative A decided to make a loan it considered how that loan affected the chance that it would have
trouble or even fail. But the management committee of cooperative A had no reason to take into account
the damage that bad news from their cooperative could create for other cooperatives. One way to view
the auditing association is that it helped to internalize that externality. This is one reason for complaints that
the association was too tough: the association was tougher because in its recommendations it took into
account the costs of damage to the entire group that can result from bad news in one cooperative. The
auditors accepted a lower level of risk of failure in a cooperative because any publicized failure would
inflict damage on other cooperatives. This argument implies a more subtle role of the association: there is a
sense in which each cooperative wanted other cooperatives to belong and be subject to the association’s
discipline, but not be subject to the discipline itself. 
Another line of argument for auditing associations turns on their ability to take care of problems
quietly and internally. This feature of auditing practice reflects these reputation problems. Above we noted
the case of embezzlement in the Maulburg cooperative in 1899. We cannot say how well-publicized this
event was, but we know that the auditor worked out an agreement within the cooperative whereby the late
embezzler’s widow repaid the cooperative for what he took. The cooperative did not fail, and there was no30 See Guinnane (1997) for the details of several such stories.
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public confrontation required for the cooperative to get its money back. A stock-in-trade of many
cooperative publications was lurid stories about embezzlements and other problems in cooperatives of
another group. The stories usually insinuate that the problems result from flaws common to all cooperatives
of that type.30 While it is possible that a private auditor would have done the same, he would not have the
same incentive to solve the problem quietly. One could argue, in fact, that a private auditor would want the
event publicized to trumpet his own competence and garner additional business from other clients.
We can infer a bit more about the private auditors from debates about compulsory membership in
auditing associations. The 1889 had not entirely satisfied the cooperative movement because it left open
mechanisms for audit that were outside the control of any part of the movement. Discussion of various
alternative proposals reveals some interesting nuances on the question. Crüger, who at that time headed
the Schulze-Delitzsch cooperative federation, argued in 1913 against compulsory membership in auditing
associations. He noted that most of the auditing associations in his group insisted on an audit before a
cooperative could join, a process that led some to be rejected. Compulsory membership (which implies that
all auditing associations would be compelled to accept some undesirable cooperatives as members) would,
he argued, reduce the quality of the auditing associations and the audits themselves. In a move typical of
the lively debate within the Schulze-Delitzsch group, its main organ, the Blätter für
Genossenschaftswesen, in 1914 published a dissenting view by a Mr. Petersen. Petersen argued (not very
clearly) that is was important for all cooperatives to be audited by some association, and he thought that the
element of choice present in the ability to switch from one auditing association to another was enough to
preserve the only good features of being able to go to a private auditor. He noted that one reason some
cooperatives preferred a wild status was that the supervision committee feared excessive interference31 Crüger’s comments are in Blätter für Genossenschaftswesen 1913, p.808. Petersen’s dissenting article is in Blätter für
Genossenschaftswesen 1914, pp.170-172.
32 There was no system of deposit insurance for banks in our period.
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from the auditor, implying that non-cooperative auditors took a more hands-off approach. He also alludes
to a frequent complaint about the auditing associations, which is that the combination of membership fees
and auditing fees cost the cooperative more than a private auditor. In the end Petersen’s proposal is that all
cooperatives be required to belong to an auditing association, but that they be allowed to chose their
association and switch from one to the other. He does not address Crüger’s concern (that an association
be forced to accept a weak cooperative as a member).31 By forcing all cooperatives to belong to an
auditing association the movement as a whole could generate greater discipline.
Given the actual experience of the credit cooperatives, it is not possible to test for the
effectiveness of the auditing associations. As noted, we have some detail published by auditing
associations, but know very little about wild cooperatives, and so cannot form meaningful comparisons. But
the associations’ effects were in all likelihood far-reaching and subtle. We have stressed the importance of
oversight and discipline, but there are other effects. Kluge (1991, pp. 172-173) argues that effective
external supervision made the liability form of  cooperatives less important, as depositors grew to rely more
and more on the auditors for assurance that the cooperative was safe.32 The additional security of the
auditing associations reduced the pressure on local cooperatives to perform perfectly, making it easier for
them to use new and untrained managers. We cannot attach any quantitative estimate to this impact, but
surely one of the movement’s contributions to German society (as Schulze-Delitzsch hoped) was the
training of a cadre of new leaders.34
4. Summary and Conclusions 
Rural credit cooperatives in nineteenth century were run, by necessity and intent, by people with
little formal business experience and almost no book-keeping experience. Reliance on these managers
opened the cooperatives up to problems of fraud and the less dire consequences of faulty book-keeping.
The institutions dealt with these potential problems with a combination of local and regional responses that
were characteristic of the system overall. First, they paid their most important manager, the treasurer.
Second, they tended not to replace members of the management committee at elections. There are several
possible interpretations of this behavior, but the low turnover of managers undeniably means that the
cooperative built up, over time, a cadre of experienced people in these positions. Finally, the cooperative
system developed regional auditing associations that help to check and train local managers. Some of the
auditor’s responsibility was simple auditing, but much took a more constructive role, providing the local
cooperatives with helpful materials and eventually setting up formal training courses for cooperative
managers. The solution to the problems posed by local managers is typical of the system overall: the
cooperatives drew from the strength of local knowledge and social ties, and used regional organizations to
offset some of the limitations of local managers.
The cooperatives faced a more severe problem of an issue that faces the managers of any
enterprise. The enterprise must not only be well-run, its managers must be able to communicate to others
— stockholders in the case of firms, members in the case of cooperatives, depositors in the case of banks
or credit cooperatives  — that it is in fact well-run. Carruthers and Espeland (1991) call attention to the
rhetorical functions of accounting and auditing of business enterprises. Accounting conventions not only
create and organize information for the firm’s managers, they are part of an effort to legitimize the35
enterprise to outsiders. In their early years credit cooperatives faced serious problems of legitimacy and
needed a powerful way of signaling their strength to outsiders. In their auditing associations they found a
way to improve their management and demonstrate their quality to others. 36
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Table 1: Summary of the characteristics of credit cooperatives in the several auditing groups, 1914


















Schulze-Delitzsch 3.23  14.51  16.53  40.91  909  570  743 
Haas 49.85  37.31  49.31  11.63  1020  95  71 
Raiffeisen 26.72  23.17  0.08  0.03  1028  110  115 
Hauptverband 0.27  1.05  16.49  12.78  738  494  233 
Other association 17.78  20.32  4.41  14.62  733  145  996 
“Wild” 2.14  3.64  13.18  20.04  743  215  456 
Source: Zeitschrift des Königlichen Preussischen statistischen Bureaus. Mitteilungen zur deutschen
Genossenschaftsstatistik, 1918. Extracted from Table IIIb, p.66*.
Notes:  Table excludes 45 credit cooperatives with contributory liability. There were 16,697 credit
cooperatives with unlimited liability and 2,450 cooperatives with limited liability included in this survey.